Instead, “The philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.” (255) This consists of giving up the quest for the essence of language within its logical structure, for this only obscures the vast variety of ways we use language. Rather, we should identify problems that arise when one tries to examine language and alleviate misunderstandings about how language is used. Thus, a large portion of the Investigations is devoted to deconstructing common assumptions about language and identifying the reasons why it is so difficult to get to the bottom of many concepts that we hold to be central to a functioning language. This method will allow for the description of language, without imposing inaccurate or insufficient theories. The congruency of Wittgenstein’s method with his later conception of the nature of language is apparent; the inability to make generalizations about language is due to its function based multiplicity and inescapability. We cannot take off our language glasses and analyze the world without them in order to see how the glasses affect our ‘vision.’

A concept that is thought of as being fundamental in the nature of language and to philosophy in general is that of the understanding. He warns against attributing a metaphysical conception or any kind of unusual importance to the term, which would strive for an essence of what it is to understand. Wittgenstein’s view of language in general shifted from systematic to the picture of the ancient city, his analytic goal has shifted in parallel fashion from the isomorphism of pictures and states of affairs to the loose characterization of terms as ‘family resemblances.’ He emphasis on this notion of flexible definitions is evident with the analogy of the thread, whose strength is based on the multitude of overlapping fibers, which if we search only for a singular explanation, we overlook. (67) The idea of the ‘family resemblance’ and the thread analogy describes how he hopes to determine meanings for words. It will not be by looking for a common thread, but by examining the possibilities of their use, which will demonstrate the undefined and obscure nature of language. So if Wittgenstein’s investigation is to expose not the logical of the language, but show, in contrast, the indefinite and elusive qualities of language, then this will have a great affect on the understanding of our uses in language of the word understanding. The idea of ‘understanding’ is an important one and this examination will also necessarily reveal how Wittgenstein views language.

We must into account the nature of the investigation and realizing that Wittgenstein is examining the understanding in order to show how it’s uses are varied, yet share a family resemblance. Thus, he warns against the urge to define understanding without examining its overlapping and various meanings and uses. “Try not to think of the understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all. —For that is the expression which confuses you.” (154) Thus, Wittgenstein goes on to show the varied uses and meanings of ‘understanding.’ The first example will reveal a central concept of the Investigations, the language-game.

Wittgenstein shows how understanding is related to playing the language-game in section 85 when he elucidates the confusion of how rules operate in language-games. He offers the analogy of language as a game to illustrate the interpretive difficulties of language. Based on the assumptions about language made thus far, we can already tell that Wittgenstein’s conception about what a ‘game’ is cannot be boiled down to a common theme. We cannot set rules for what is a game, but can only “look and see…. similarities, relationships and whole series of them at that.” (66) Here we are just playing the game language-game and we are brought back to Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance. Thus, the game analogy is helpful, but it is also subject to the ambiguities of language that allow the analogy to be helpful to begin with. This shows the inescapability of language, which is a consistent theme throughout Wittgenstein’s works.

The analogy is instructive because it implies a context that one must be aware of in order to make effective judgments; this context is created by assumptions or rules. An example of how this context works is in section 85. “A rule stands there like a sign-post. –Does the sign-post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go?” First, this example shows how there are many ways in which one can interpret a rule, however explicit it may seem to be. For there must be rules for reading the rules and then in turn rules for reading the rules for reading the rules; and so the language-game governs the understanding in all cases. So understanding here is the correct interpretation of the context as informed by the rules.

The infinite regress of understanding is a concerning specter for two reasons. First, as we shall see later in the paper, Wittgenstein will outline how understanding can be reconciled with what seems a maelstrom of linguistic dimensions. Secondly, it shows that Wittgenstein’s early work in the Tractatus, was misguided if we accept the more mature view of his later work. Wittgenstein argues that the use of logic itself is not misguided, but the attempt to reduce all of language and thence the world down to logical propositions obscures one’s view of the world and does not take into account much of what language expresses, which is beyond the analysis of logical constructions down to the states of affairs that one pictures in his mind. The denotation model of logical atomism is similar to Augustine’s naïve explanation of how language is taught through ostensive definitions. Wittgenstein provides a hypothetical though experiment which expresses the Augustinian constraints on language in section 2.

In this hypothetical scenario, A is building with stones in the form of blocks, pillars, slabs, and beams and B has to retrieve and pass the correct stones to A as he needs them. The two are communicating only through movements and the use of these simple words. Their language then seems to consist only of these four simple words and it is only in using these simples that clear communication is established. A’s slab language limits itself to a word/object relationship while it is evident that we do a lot more when using language than that of the builder and assistant. His picture is too limited to specific places, types, and scenarios of language and fails to recognize the more complex operations of language that occur in addressing people or in expressing one’s conscious, mental frameworks and understandings. For ex, the slab language possesses no means for describing things, asking questions, speculating, making requests, giving commands, solving problems, or performing an enormous number of other aspects of meaningful communication. Additionally, this primitive slab language also seems to lack an explanation for the ways in which more simple operations of language function. For instance, A provides no account for how words such as ‘help’, ‘ouch’, or ‘wow’ function in regular language use. Though these words are not necessarily complicated in their traditional sense, their usages do not seem to fit into the A picture; as there is no object for which these words stand. So it then seems that A is mistaken and that there are times when meaning CAN be attached to words regardless of whether or not there is an object present to attach it to.

So, this reduction of meaning to denotation is strives for clarity at the expense of explanatory power and adaptability. Thus, Wittgenstein questions why it is that logic and the laying out of a perfect language seem so ‘sublime.’ Instead of trying to get to the bottom of what made language work and constructing a language based around these principles, Wittgenstein criticizes the philosophical urge to ‘penetrate’ or reveal some latent cause that explains everything. Rather, he intends to use a descriptive method that will trace the intricacies and misunderstanding about language. Therefore, Wittgenstein eschews a deep analysis in favor of a wide description. A good distinction between logic as a language game and logic as the ideal language is drawn in section 107, where he says,

“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity was not the result of investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty. –We have got on slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!”

If we use logic to define our language, then we cannot use it the way we need to in order for language to become advantageous and so predominant in our lives. Thus, it must be, for if language is so powerful that it defines the limits of our world, then it must be the case that it must fit with our lives. The friction he speaks of is the difficulty we have in which to master the language. We will return to this point at the end of the paper.

Wittgenstein adds another layer to the concept of the understanding with the odd possibilities that come from trying to implement a stringent conception of ‘understanding.’ He juxtaposes understanding as a mental state with that of the interpretation of the rules outlined above. He says at the bottom of page 59,”When do you know how to play chess? All the time? Or just while you are making a move?…How queer that knowing how to play chess should take such a short time, and a game so much longer!” He goes on to describe, in section 151 that “there is also this use of the word ‘to know’” “A has written down the number 1, 5, 11, 19, 29; at this point B says he knows how to go on. What happened here?” (151) How do we know that he knows the rule that A is basing the sequence on? The definition of ‘understands’ is discrepant between the A and B. For B, it seems to be a mental state, a light bulb going on, but for A it seems to be “the circumstances under which he had such an experience.” (155) In the next sections, from 156-171, Wittgenstein uses the example of trying to define what reading is, as the experience seems to be similar in the sense of a mental phenomena; again he runs into the same problems of a variety of inconsistent uses. Thus, the criteria for determining if ‘reading’ has happened or not depends on the context of how we mean ‘reading’ and the perspective from which we view.

However, it is also the case that Wittgenstein is not just deconstructing the concept of ‘understanding’ in order to demonstrate it’s many possibilities, but he is also using it to try to develop a way in which we may make sense of the language-games; it is in being aware of one’s movement among and between language-games that Wittgenstein wants us to be aware of.In section 146, he begins to discuss this role of ‘understanding’ by claiming “the application is still a criterion of understanding” Moreover, in 152, the criterion that “the formula occurs to him” cannot suffice for what we expect of the understanding. Thus, ‘understanding’ for Wittgenstein is most importantly the ability to follow rules and understand contexts correctly, which will constitute “a state which is the source of the correct use.” (146) Thus, in order to understand the rules and be aware of the assumptive contexts implicit in any task of understanding, one must have learned that ability through experience. In order to navigate the difficult course to understanding what is actually going on in a certain case, one must be aware of the fact that there are rules and contexts, but this cannot be learned until one sees how a rule constrains the correct usage or application. Thus, one must be exposed to a public set of conventions and institutions, which are not explicit in the language, but make their presence known on the language. “To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique.” (199) This emphasizes the import that Wittgenstein places on understanding and also what is required to come to an understanding about language. Thus, in section 107, Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘friction’ is the difficulty which we have in understanding the way language works, as we have to become aware of all sorts of rules, which some, like any good backyard football game are only an issue once you break them. Thus, we cannot expect to study language from afar, we are forced to walk around in it’s shoes. This is what makes the descriptive method of Wittgenstein so interesting and insightful. His ability to illuminate a subject of that is often too close for us to even ask the right questions.